

1 “a demand for the relief sought[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3). *See also Bell Atl. Corp. v.*
2 *Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (explaining that the purpose of Rule 8 is to “give the
3 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”). Although
4 all allegations of material fact are taken as true and they are construed in the light most
5 favorable to the plaintiff, Rule 8’s pleading standard requires that the complaint contain
6 enough facts to show a “plausible entitlement to relief[.]” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. A
7 complaint should only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
8 no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. *Id.* Furthermore, a
9 court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law for “(1) lack of a cognizable legal theory
10 or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.” *Smile Care Dental Group v. Delta*
11 *Dental Plan of California, Inc.*, 88 F.3d 780, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1996); *see also Associated*
12 *Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters*, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983) (reiterating that “[i]t
13 is not . . . proper to assume that [the plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged or that
14 the defendants have violated . . . [laws] in ways that have not been alleged.”).

15 Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that “[a] party may amend its
16 pleading once as a matter of course[] before being served with a responsive pleading[.]” FED
17 R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A). *See also McGuckin v. Smith*, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992)
18 (“Before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint, the district court must provide the litigant
19 with notice of the deficiencies and an opportunity to amend unless it is absolutely clear the
20 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”).

21 **III. ANALYSIS**

22 *A. Complaint Fails to State a Claim upon which Relief may be Granted*

23 Although the Court has a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally, the complaint
24 fails to assert both a claim upon which relief could be granted and a basis for relief. First, a
25 complaint must allege a cause of action: this requires a legal wrong the plaintiff claims to
26 have suffered. *See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain*, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (alleging denial of right
27 to minimally adequate education). Here, Plaintiff merely asserts that a “defendant has a right
28 to a fair trial.” (Doc. #1.) Plaintiff does not assert that either Defendant in this case actually

1 violated his right to a fair trial. Even assuming Plaintiff had alleged he was denied the right
2 to a fair trial by the named Defendants, Plaintiff does not explain how either of the
3 Defendants deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Moreover, a complaint must set out the
4 basic facts and legal reasons why the plaintiff believes he is entitled to relief. *Ashcroft v.*
5 *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 150 (2009) (“where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
6 to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has
7 not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief”) (internal quotations omitted). However,
8 Plaintiff’s blanket assertion that he has a right to a fair trial fails to give Defendants “fair
9 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at
10 556 n.3. Specifically, the Complaint does not allege any facts that identify the basis of
11 Plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a
12 claim upon which relief may be granted.

13 *B. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Cause of Action is not a Cognizable Legal Theory*

14 Even after viewing the Complaint liberally, which this Court is required to do in cases
15 involving pro se litigants, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory. Although
16 Plaintiff’s argument is unclear, it appears that Plaintiff is either challenging his state court
17 conviction, in which case this is the wrong venue; or, Plaintiff is suing for damages for a
18 wrongful conviction. If the latter, Plaintiff is required to establish that his assault conviction
19 was reversed. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)
20 (holding that a § 1983 action seeking, *inter alia*, punitive monetary damages, where the
21 lawsuit challenged the legality of the conviction but the conviction or sentence had not been
22 invalidated, was not cognizable under § 1983).¹ Therefore, even if Watkins had alleged, and
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24 ¹ For damages in a § 1983 cause of action, the Court must consider whether a
25 judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily invalidate the conviction. *Heck*, 512 U.S.
26 at 487. If it would, then the plaintiff must show that the conviction has already been
27 invalidated. *Id.* Here, Watkins’ implied § 1983 cause of action would likely challenge the
28 validity of his conviction if the perjured testimony led to his conviction because Watkins
would have been deprived of the due process right to a fair trial. *See Napue v. Illinois*, 360
U.S. 264, 269 (1959). It is the actual conviction, however, not just the use of the perjured

1 could prove, sufficient facts that his conviction was the result of Defendant's alleged illegal
2 conduct—which Plaintiff has failed to do—this is not a cognizable legal theory in a civil action
3 unless the conviction has been reversed.

4 **IV. CONCLUSION**

5 Because Plaintiff's Complaint does not set forth a cognizable legal theory or facts to
6 show entitlement to relief, it fails to state a proper claim upon which relief can be granted.
7 Plaintiff must become familiar with, and follow, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
8 the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

9 Accordingly,

10 **IT IS ORDERED** that Defendant Yavapai County's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #8) is
11 **granted**.

12 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the Court also dismisses Plaintiff's claims against
13 Defendant Wilson.²

14 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Defendant Yavapai County's Motion to Strike
15 (Doc. #13) is **denied**.


16 **IT IS FINALLY ORDERED** that the Court shall grant leave to file an Amended
17 Complaint **no later than 30 days** after the date of this Order. The Clerk of the Court is
18 directed to enter a judgment of dismissal without prejudice and without further notice to
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21 testimony, that creates the constitutional injury. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (statement under oath
22 constitutes perjury if it is false, knowingly made, and material to the proceeding). This is why
23 Plaintiff is required to show that his conviction has been invalidated to prove this type of
24 constitutional injury.

25 ² Even though Defendant Normal Wilson did not move to dismiss, the Court is
26 dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Wilson because Defendant Wilson is in a
27 position similar to Defendant Yavapai County and Plaintiff's claims against both defendants
28 are integrally related. *Silverton v. Dep't of Treasury*, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981);
Abigninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 743 (9th Cir. 2008) ("A [d]istrict [c]ourt
may properly on its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have not moved to
dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants.").

1 Plaintiff if Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days from the date of this
2 Order.

3 Dated this 17th day of November, 2009.

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7 James A. Teilborg
8 United States District Judge
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